In a speech at West point on Tuesday evening, President Obama announced his revised strategy towards Afghanistan committing, 30,000 additional troops. The new strategy does not give an exact timeframe for transition of responsibilities from allied troops to Afghan security forces.
Places deep dependent on corrupt Afghan government, this makes its implementation more challenging. To succeed in Afghanistan the US should better account for the realities on ground and the complexities of the local culture.
The administration of Hamid Karzai is incapable of helping the United States in attaining their objectives in Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan is corrupt and corruption starts from Karzai's family. Back in 2001, Mahmoud Karzai, elder brother of the president, was running a handful of restaurants in Baltimore and Boston in the U.S.
Today, due to his family ties with the presidency, Mr. Mahmoud is one of the Afghanistan's most prominent and prosperous businessperson. Besides, he is one of the main brokers for all major business deals in Afghanistan. American and Afghan officials have accused younger brother of the president, Ahmad Wali Karzai, who is the head of Kandahar provincial council, of narcotics trafficking and other corruptions.
The new U.S. strategy demands that Karzai's government take on corruption in Afghanistan, which has shattered the very foundation of the country. Question arises; whether president Karzai would be able to go after his brothers and relatives before he could expand anti-corruption drive across the board? Success of the new U.S. strategy would largely depend upon an unbiased and corruption-free government in Afghanistan.
Karzai's appointed governors in the regional provinces are corrupt and people have lost trust and confidence in their governance. Taliban on the other side have formed shadow governments in these rural areas, which represents an important element of Taliban's strategy. For many Afghans, there is no choice.
They favor the frightening and cruel shadow government of Taliban to the corrupt and inefficient administration of Karzai. Their increasing corruption and incompetence have compelled residents of these areas to turn towards Taliban's shadow government for their internal problems and disputes. These shadow governments have attributed to the prevailing disarray in Afghanistan thus making the U.S. efforts more daunting.
Removing these shadow governments and establishing corruption-free administration of Karzai's government in the next year and half is far from reality. Nevertheless, establishment of unbiased, efficient, and corruption-free governments is vital for the success of Obama's new strategy in Afghanistan.
Giving timeline of 18 months to start withdrawing U.S. troops and hand over the responsibilities to a fragile and weak Afghan government is not based on realities. The U.S. is already giving itself a limited timetable to accomplish its multifarious objectives. The goals that the U.S. administration has set ahead in the new strategy would be unable to achieve during this short period.
The U.S. intends to blunt the Taliban's offensive by sending additional 30,000 troops along with an unspecified number of NATO troops that is hoped to join the theater. The U.S. planners believe that the space created by counteroffensive against Taliban will be used to train Afghan forces and civil structure to take over the responsibilities thus allowing U.S. troops to start withdrawing as planned.
As per the new strategy, withdrawal will start July 2011, but it does not provide magnitude of withdrawal and the date when the withdrawal would conclude rather linking it with the ground situation, which is leaving future of this strategy in limbo. Considering the growing insurgency, weak and corrupt government, and naive approach of the U.S. towards Afghanistan, the U.S. aspirations are likely to meet its doomsday.
The U.S. administration is mistaken to rely on Afghanistan National Army (ANA) of shouldering responsibilities of their country in July 2011. To build the capacity of ANA to a level where they take a lead role and contribute towards the new U.S. strategy is far from reality. There are numerous factors, which have added towards making ANA an ineffective organization.
The U.S. forces who have served with ANA say that they are largely slipshod, corrupt and capable of doing little more than basic daytime operations. They have yet to take years to demonstrate as a potent military force. There are incidents where Taliban sympathizers in ANA have shot and killed allied troops, which has plagued a greater mistrust, hostility, and disrespect amongst Afghan and foreign troops.
Ongoing plans to expand ANA by a faster pace of about 1500 soldiers a month is badly affecting the minimum standards required for a soldier. Eighty percent of the soldiers and officers are illiterate. Only 20 percent of the soldiers in ANA have professional knowledge, the rest are former militia fighters or young recruits. Ethnic division is another worry; the ANA has failed to address this important issue. Commanders are always from a different ethnicity than their troops. Nonetheless, Tajiks are disproportionately represented in the officer class.
These non-pakhtun soldiers are not welcomed in southern and eastern Afghanistan and treated as foreigners. People at large call it "an Army of National Rivalries". An organization with such a reputation would be unable to deliver and come up to the desired requirements of president Obama's new strategy in Afghanistan.
To succeed in Afghanistan the United States administration instead of national government of Karzai should concentrate more on building the capacity of local governments and political players. After recent controversial presidential elections, Taliban's propaganda that national politics are staged in Afghanistan and president Karzai is a puppet in the hands of U.S. has gained more strength.
Resultant, the present regime has lost its credibility to deliver and contribute towards the new U.S. strategy. Particular attention should be paid to the significance and relevance of Pakhtun traditional customs and laws, to the wider influence of strong Pukhtun community spread around eastern and southern Afghanistan. United States objectives of the new strategy should be calibrated to take account of these ground realities.
The U.S. should support the gradual integration of these Pukhtun dominated areas into the mainstream by making them stakeholders thus giving them an assurance that they are not treated as neglected and they have an important role to play in development and security of Afghanistan in the future.
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