Meta-ethics

Tue, 12 Aug 2008 18:35:00 EST

The western ethical philosophy had shown three constant themes through over the last two millenniums since the Sophists till the 20th century.

They are - (1) disagreements over whether ethical judgments are truths about the world or only reflections of the whishes of those who make them,

(2) frequent attempts to show, in the face of considerable skepticism, either that it is in one's own interest to do what is good or that, even though this is not necessarily in one's own interest, it is the rational thing to do, and

(3) repeated debates over just what goodness and the standard of right and wrong might be. The last century has seen new twists to these old themes and an increased attention to the application of ethics to practical problems. The major concerns listed above may be considered as meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics respectively.

The methodology of ethics, also called meta-ethics, seeks to clarify the nature of ethical enquiry itself. It examines the logical functions of ethical language and the meaning of the ethical terms. Methodology may not be directly concerned with the question of what ethical principles one may have to adopt. But it has important bearings on ethics proper. For example, any specification of the meaning of the questions such as ‘what is good life?', ‘what is duty?', etc may influence one's views on what good life is and what one's duties are? Like moral persuasion, methodology is not distinctly separated from ethics proper. An ethical treatise consists of moralizing with the help of an ethical theory defended on methodological grounds.

Ethics by itself may not be a vehicle for becoming a better person. It will, however, help by making an individual intelligently aware of what is involved in holding an ethical belief and by cultivating a critical approach to the ethical principles. It helps one to realize clearly the great complexity of ethical problems and the many varied aspects of the ethical principles we habitually employ. It also helps to achieve a grasp of factors relevant to evaluation and application of ethical principles.

Ethics helps an individual to gain an acquaintance with ethical values of humanistic study. It includes a summation of important human values. The ethical philosophy of a given period sheds light on the attitudes and beliefs of the people of the time and thus helps in interpreting history of that period.

Meta-ethics deals not with substantive ethical theories or moral judgments, but rather with questions about the nature of these theories and judgments. One example of the methodology of meta-ethics is the ‘open question argument'. It consists of taking the proposed definition of good and turning it into a question.

For example, if the proposed definition is ‘Good means whatever leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number', then the question asked is, ‘is whatever leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number good?' If the question is meaningful, that is, a negative answer is not self-contradictory, then the definition cannot be right, for a definition is supposed to preserve the meaning of the term defined.

For the proponents of meta-ethics, the open question argument does not do anything to show that pleasure, for instance, is not the sole criterion of the goodness of an action. It only shows that this cannot be known to be true by definition, and so, if it is to be known at all, it must be known by some other means. Basically they argue that all attempts to derive ethical conclusions from anything not itself ethical in nature are bound to fail.

The modern intuitionists in the footsteps of the proponents of meta-ethics claim that ethical knowledge is gained through an immediate apprehension of its truth. In other words, a true ethical judgment is self-evident as long as we are reflecting clearly and calmly, and our judgment is not distorted by self-interest or faulty upbringing. They take ‘the convictions of thoughtful, well-educated people as the data of ethics'. This is subject to the condition that some may be illusory and they should be rejected when they do not stand up to ‘the test of reflection'.

The intuitionists differ on the nature of the moral truths that are apprehended in this way. For some, they are valuable in themselves such as the pleasures of friendship and the enjoyment of beauty. Some others consider that we know it to be our duty to do acts of a certain type. These differences in approach reveal the lack of agreement about modern judgments that each claims to be self-evident.

Moral intuitionism faded over a period of time in the face of logical positivism. According to this approach, all true statements fall into two categories - logical truths and statements of fact. Moral judgments cannot fit into either category. They cannot be logical truths as they are no more than what conform to definitions. Nor are they the statements of fact as there is no way of verifying the truths the intuitionists claim to apprehend. This has led to the concept that moral judgments could not be truths at all.

This has led to the distinction of the facts a sentence may convey from the emotive impact it is intended to have. Moral judgments are significant because of their emotive impact. In saying that something is wrong, we are not merely expressing our disapproval of it, but encouraging those to whom we speak, to share our attitude. This is why we bother to argue about our moral views to secure their acceptance by others. The emotivists, on the other hand, are accused of being subjectivists in the sense that there are no possible standards of right and wrong other than one's own subjective feelings.

A different form of subjectivism has come into being in the form of existentialism. Its concept is ‘to say that we are compelled by our situation, our nature or our role in life to act in a certain way is to exhibit bad faith'. As long as we choose ‘authentically', there are no moral standards by which our conduct can be criticized.

Another approach to moral judgments has also developed. According to it, moral judgments are not primarily seeking to describe anything. Nor are we simply expressing our attitudes. Instead, moral judgments prescribe while the actions describe. The choice of prescription is that of the individual. No one will tell another what he or she must think right. Herein lies moral freedom. Not withstanding the element of choice, the moral freedom guaranteed by descriptivism is compatible with a substantial amount of reasoning about moral judgments.

Such reasoning is possible because moral judgments must be universalizable. This universalizability is not a substantive moral principle, but a logical feature of the moral terms. This means that anyone who uses such terms as right and ought is committed to universalizability. Universalizability is a powerful means of reasoning against certain moral judgments. It can also be used to test the relevance of any difference.

Any value is defined in terms of the natural quality of being desired or being an object of interest. The greatest moral value is, therefore, to be found in whatever leads to the harmonious integration of interests. A moral principle must have a particular kind of content, that is, it must deal, for instance, with some aspect of wants, welfare or flourishing. Morality may be defined in such a way that moral principles are restricted to those that maximize well-being of the community.

When a moral judgment is to be prescribed universally, one must take into account all the ideals and preferences held by all those who will be affected by the action one is judging. In taking these into account, one cannot give any special weight to one's own ideals merely because they are one's own. The effect of this application of universalizability is that for a moral judgment to be universalizable, it must ultimately be based on the maximum possible satisfaction of the preferences of all those affected by it.

Even if moral judgments do not correspond to any objective facts or self-evident truths, they may still be proper candidates for being true or false. This position has come to be known as moral realism. For some, it makes moral judgments true or false at the cost of taking objectivity out of the notion of truth.

Our reasons for acting morally must depend on our desires because reason in action applies only to the best way of achieving what we desire. This view of practical reason virtually precludes any general answer to the question ‘why should I be moral?' Intuitionists reject all attempts to offer extraneous reasons for being moral. For them, morality carries its own internal reasons for being followed. For the emotivists, anything an individual desires can be considered moral. This does not satisfy all, as all desires do not lead to generally accepted morality.
The connection between morality and self-interest is hard to rationalize. It is common experience that those who aim directly at their personal happiness in a selfish way do not find it. On the other hand, those whose lives have meaning or purpose apart from their own happiness, find happiness as well. If reason must always be based on desire, even our normal idea of prudence becomes incoherent.

One aspect of meta-ethical significance, propounded by Rawls, is his idea that a sound moral theory is one that matches reflective moral judgments. According to him, our ‘reflective moral judgments' serve as a testing ground. This concept, however, weakens the notion of the applicability of certain independent standard to test the validity of the moral theory.

Another aspect of meta-ethical significance propounded by R.B. Brandt is his idea that everything capable of being expressed by the word ‘good' can be more clearly stated in terms of rational desires. He considers that an ideal process of cognitive psychotherapy eliminates all desires based on false beliefs, desires relating to the future, desires or aversions caused by others or early deprivation, etc. Whatever desires remain after such filtration are rational desires.

According to him, the notions of morally right and morally wrong are useful. What is morally wrong is what is prohibited by any moral code that fully rational people in a society approve of. He raises a question whether it is always rational to act morally. His answer is that such desires as benevolence survive cognitive psychotherapy and, therefore, a rational person will be benevolent.

Similarly, a rational person will also be averse to dishonesty and have other moral motives. But these motives may occasionally conflict with self-interested desires and there is no guarantee that the moral motives will be the stronger. A fully rational person might support a certain kind of moral code and yet not act in accordance with it on every occasion.

As seen from the above, enough can be said on either side of the central issues of meta-ethics. There is ample room for disagreement about the extent to which reason can bring about agreed decisions on what we ought to do. There also remains the dispute about whether it is proper to refer to moral judgments as true or false. A complete reconciliation between morality and self-interest continues to be elusive as it has been through the ages.

K. R. Paramahamsa is an author of book DHARMA

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Meta-ethics